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6 reasons why my VC funded startup did fail

Sorry for the inconvenience, got slashdotted by reddit. Never thought so many were
interested. And no, scaling was not one of the reasons the startup failed ;-) No ssh from my work so it took some time to fix it. Thanks for coming (back)

During the dot com boom I founded a software startup with some friends – with me as the CTO. We developed a software for knowledge management. It was a combination of blogs, wikis, a document management system, link managment, skill managment and more. We started in 1999 which was quite early for wikis and blogs (Moveable Type was announced 2001). The link management system was essentialy the same as Delicious later. Beside all those new ideas (for 1999 at least) there were three great features:

  • Everything could be tagged. Skills, people, links, documents, blog posts, wikis, something which is today called folksonomies. Tags could refer to other tags to form onthologies. Tags could link to other documents, blog posts, persons.
  • Everything could be rated from 1 to 5
  • We had a clever fuzzy search based on tags and ratings. Searching for “people with oracle knowledge” would also reveal experts for SQL Server – for example to stuff your project if an Oracle guru wasn’t available

We’ve got quite some money as a seed investment from a VC and were quite happy and successfully developing our application. We did show it to many users and received very favorable feedback from big companies. Why did the startup fail and I’m no millionaire? There are a myriad of reasons, but as I wrote in “Rules for a successful business”, the rules for a sucessful business are easy:

  • The customer is the most important thing in your business
  • The best business plan is to sell people the things they want
  • Your business is successful if your earnings are higher than your spendings

So the most important thing is to sell – a fact lots of startups forget. And we did too. After much thought it comes down to these six reasons why we failed (beside the obvious one that the VC market imploded when we needed money and noone was able to get any funding):

  1. We didn’t sell anything
  2. We didn’t sell anything
  3. We didn’t sell anything
  4. The market window was not yet open
  5. We focused too much on technology
  6. We had the wrong business model

In more detail:

We didn’t sell anything, Part 1

We didn’t sell anything because we didn’t have a product to sell. As good engineers we wanted to wait until the product is finished and then start selling. Midway we started selling nevertheless with a nearly finished 1.0. This led to too much focus on development and not enough on sales. Without a finished product we thought we couldn’t go to customers and try to sell it. We’ve slowly learned two things:

  • You don’t need a product to start selling if it’s software. The first sales meetings with managment were perfectly possible with screenshots, mockups and slides. As the topic was new to our customers, we first needed to convince them on the concepts (wikis, blogs, tagging) and that could be done without a finished product.
  • Start selling before you found the company. Start selling now! You do not need to have a company to sell new ideas to customers. Start selling now! When people really want to buy your product, start the company.

We didn’t sell anything, Part 2

We didn’t sell anything because we had no sales person. Bummer. Of course we were looking for one and the business plan said: High priority is finding a sales person for the founding team. This took time and resources and we didn’t have that. If you want to sell something, get a sales founder or hire someone from the start.

We didn’t sell anything, Part 3

We didn’t sell something because customers wouldn’t buy. The product was great, the customers favorable, but they took too long to decide. We wanted to sell a knowledge managment tool bottom up to project managers and through them to companies. But everytime a superior heard of knowledge managment he decided it should be on his agenda. So the topic of knowledge managment moved up the chain of command and we had no real decision maker. We talked to irrelevant people (because the topic became strategic fast for our customers) and lost lots of time. Ask people if they are allowed to buy your product. Get to the one who says “Yes” fast. We had several big companies in our sales queue and I’m sure they would have bought in the end, but as a startup we couldn’t wait. SAP for example compared to us could have waited and sold the product after 12 months. Selling enterprise software takes a lot of time.

The market window was not yet open

The market window was not yet open. Noone heard of blogs, wikis and tagging. We had to educate our customers on the benefits of wikis (Everyone can edit! Everyone! How dare they!) and blogs (Everyone can have an opinion and write about it! Everyone!) and tagging (They can build ontologies! We need a comittee to define an ontology for everyone! Otherwise chaos will eat us!) Several years later it would have been much easier to sell a blog, wiki and tagging plattform.

We focused too much on technology

All the founders were interested in technology. We’ve worked with EJBs (not mature back then), we made everything spit out XML and rendered that to HTML with XSLT (not fast enough), wrote our own OR-Mapper – what a stupid idea (Hibernate not available), tried CSS driven websites (not enough knowledge available back then). This lead to rewrites and took lots of our time. Discussions about technology – we should have talked about customers – took time too and led to frustration.

We had the wrong business model

Plain and simple: we had the wrong business model. Selling software can eventually reap lots of money, but it takes time. We had upfront costs, making sales deals took a lot of time and we burned money without income.

The better model would have been: Do consulting on knowledge management and start with an open source product.

We did consulting to companies on how to do knowledge managment, use wikis etc. But we didn’t take any money for it, because it was part of our sales process. Focusing on cosulting and billing people would have created a steady income.

I did get into open source later with SnipSnap. SnipSnap took (a small part of) the ideas from the startup (wiki and blog) and was relased as an open source tool. Lots of people downloaded the software and installed it on their desktops. We really made installing SnipSnap easy, so it spread fast. I’ve talked to a boss of a very big software and consulting shop and he told me, wikis would never work for them: too chaotic and not structured enough. Well – in fact I knew that there were several SnipSnap installations in his company :-) As others are practicing now we could have gotten our foot in the door with an open source project, then sell support and enterprise features on top. Companies later paid us money to put features into SnipSnap, make it scale better and for other enterprise thingies. But in 1999 we didn’t know as much about software business models as we know now.

What can you learn from my mistakes? Not sure, but start selling. I’ve learned a lot though about software managment, products, business models, money and being a CTO.

Thanks for listening.

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About the author: Stephan Schmidt is head of development at brands4friends. He has more than 15 years of internet technology experience and 10 years experience in agile. He was head of development, consultant and CTO and is a speaker, author and blog writer. He specializes in organizing and optimizing software development helping companies by increasing productivity with lean software development and agile methodologies. Want to know more? All views are only his own.
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Comments

Stephan, great advice! Particularly, “do consulting on knowledge management and start with an open source product.”

I had a similar experience of a failed start-up: http://softwareindustrialization.com/BridgewerxProductSuccessBusinessFailure.aspx

The one critical juncture in our company was not continuing with our successful consulting services, we gave that up to become a products company and the moment we did, was doomed for failure.

Again, excellent advice from someone that has been there. Cheers!

Aaron Abber

Too many tech oriented people think “selling is evil.” Problem is: Nobody gets paid until someone buys something.

Great article.

Anonymous

The word is “successful”, not “successfull”.

stephan

@Anon: Thanks.

@Mitch: Very good post!

@Aaron: Exactly. Unless you’re facebook ;-)

Brad Parks

Great post! I think an underlying theme you’ve got going here is “release quickly, then iterate”. If more companies focused on getting their product out the door in 3 months, then releasing updates every quarter at the worst, then I think the customer feedback would be integrated into the product so much quicker, and startup cash wouldn’t get burned so early in the cycle on features that don’t matter! Great info… thanks!

Sounds like quite a brave venture for the first nuclear winter. Thanks for sharing what you learned

Nice post, learning it hard way. but I would say this should give you a lot of experience which would make u successful in future.

Malai Lama

Adopt Buddhism, and you’ll be happy and successful. I have never heard of a Buddhist startup that failed.

stephan

@Malai: Mu!

I think another thing tech startups failed to consider during the bubble was whether or not there was an actual demand for their product. It may have seemed cool and useful to them, but would their target market agree?

Nine years later, what percentage of companies use wikis, blogs, or “skill management” software to any large degree? My non-empirical estimate is that very few do. Far too many startups in those days were peddling solutions to problems that no one knew they had.

stephan

@Dave: Atlassian is well and rich and bought some other companies. And they are mainly in the enterprise wiki sector.

@stephan,

I always considered JIRA to be Atlassian’s main product, and that’s something for which a market has long existed. Maybe I’m wrong about commercial wiki software, though. But in my own experience deploying free wikis for a couple of former employers, they would invariably be forgotten and unused after a few months.

stephan

@Dave: Ah. Yes, maybe. I did quite some Wiki research and from my impression you need a gardener for a wiki to keep it attractive. And keep people posting everything in there (post it there, send a link instead of sending a mail)

But I’ve seen companies use wikis for a long time. In some they don’t catch on, you’re right. And some use bad wikis (like MediaWiki) which are not very usable for company work.

Thanks for sharing this post, it really hammered home the fine line between keeping a lid on your project until it is complete, and the need to create awareness and sell it as it moves forward.

Cheers,
Mike

Zac

Terrific post, which I stumbled across via Reddit. I was in a similar situation in 2000-03, working for a high-tech startup tasked with using GPS as a Web authentication variable — tying one’s password or other login credentials to a physical location based on the simultaneous transfer of encrypted GPS data. (For those wanting more info, check the Wayback Machine for http://www.cyberlocator.com in the 2001-02 time frame) Our slogan: “Your location is your password.”

We had similar problems: 1) No customers because of no sales team because of no immediately deliverable product; 2) A tech team whose allegiance was torn between the brilliant but whacko founder and the business-savvy CEO who put most of the money into the company (we never did achieve VC funding); 3) Lack of decent indoor GPS receptivity (which only came available a couple of years ago, long after the place folded); 4) A legacy ownership group (pro-founder) that seemed more interested in suing potential patent infringers (OnStar was one such target) instead of backing a viable marketing plan; 5) Frequent internal debate as to whether we were offering a product or a service, how it would be priced, what was the roll-out profile, who were our customers, and what markets were the best to go after first.

By the time we figured out most of these answers, the company was out of money and our tech team had scattered to the winds, finding gainful employment elsewhere.

KoW

When do you know that you have chosen the wrong business model?

I mean, you managed to receive some fundings, that is already an achievement imho (ok, perhaps not in 1999 ;)). So when is a business model proven wrong?

stephan

@KoW: Wrong – depends on the definition. Wrong for me is: We should have chosen a different one.

With an open source / consulting model we could have made it through the dot com boom and the crash, I’m quite sure.

Selling enterprise software needs more time and more money – which doesn’t work if you haven’t enough VC money.

So it could have been right when our money would have lasted for 3 years. It was wrong for a model with the money lasting less than that.

[...] Ale uwaga! Nie klon Naszej Klasy albo kolejny nudny serwis społecznościowy. Założę się że właśnie teraz są  studenci informatyki, którzy dostają za zadanie stworzenie “czegoś jak Nasza Klasa” na zaliczenie. Czy to nie jest bardzo wyrafinowany sposób na marnowanie czasu, kreatywności, pomysłowości i umiejętności na totalnie bezużyteczną rzecz? Każdy nowy “serwis społecznościowy” powinien dostawać jakąś statuetkę np. IgStartupa. Żeby autorzy mieli pamiątkę po klapie. Zachęcam też do przeczytania wpisu “6 powodów dla których mój startup w który zainwestował fundusz Venture Capital nie powiódł się” Stephana. [...]

Andrew

I agree with you on “We didn’t sell anything, Part 2″ – you need a salesman, but I disagree with your conclusion. At the beginning the best salesman is YOU. You know what the system is, you know what the point of the system is and you know its limitations.

John

Great points. It’s easy to forget about selling when you get so excited about the product you’re making. It’s also difficult to imagine that anyone would consider buying something that isn’t written yet… but I suppose people do it with manufactured goods all the time. You sell a prototype and then you start building thousands of them… not the other way around.

A few corrections –
noone is two words – no one
In a few places you use “lead” rather than “led”, although you’ve got “led” used properly in there too. :)

John

As I read this I can’t help but explain it another way.

You didn’t have a product yet, and worse, you didn’t have a product that, even completed, necessarily did anything anybody at the time understood.

You keep saying you didn’t “sell”. Great! So you’re not some capitalist sociopath who wasn’t confident that his organization yet had a viable product yet was willing to “take orders” from customers nonetheless. That’s called being ethical, so deal with it. Part of the reason we in the United States are suffering so much now is because too many people learned enough about business to sputter out the buzzwords and even round up play money from VCs, but not enough to curb greed and avoid marketing products outside the bounds of development or conceptual viability.

A better approach would have been to market your product to your VCs as strictly a research and development project to pilot a few ideas you thought might have a future. Maybe you’d take longer finding VCs, but at least you wouldn’t have had to pretend having a product when in fact none existed yet. At least you wouldn’t be left complaining years later about your “failure” for not succumbing to blind greed and a desire for relevance.

You didn’t yet have a product, you curbed its presentation as a result, and you know what, you should be damn proud of that. Next time, just plan it that way at the outset.

John

Hey Stephan,

thanks for the tremendous insight. I too came in from the reddit post and am also part of an online startup that can make great use for tips like this. Although we aren’t funded yet, there’s nothing saying that the above points can’t apply for a group in their boot-strapping phase.

We too are stuck in a state of feature-creep and refinement while development on the sales front is definitely lacking.

We’re building an online video conferencing system based on flash that can be embedded into your site like a youtube video (www.projecho.com) but are having a hard time defining who our target audience should be. Reading this post made me realize that we should start selling everyone and then target those that look most likely to for over the cash instead of spending time trying to tailor our pitch for a specific market.

Time to start selling – tonight! Thanks again, and I will definitely be keeping my eyes on your blog going forward.

Cheers,
Beau

[...] October 28, 2008 at 1:24 am · Filed under Business [From 6 reasons why my VC funded startup did fail at Stephans Blog] [...]

Dear old friend,

totally agree, but Stephan, i am also still thinking about it :)

Greetings

Maiko

stephan

@Maiko: Maiko! Me too as this post shows :-)

Stephan, great post… I was a Co-founder of a funded company and a CTO back in the dotcom days too. Failed.

You’re dead right about selling. And I wanted to add — there is in that a deeper piece of wisdom it’s taken me many years to fully grasp….

Businesses are logical entities first and foremost. A lemonade stand is a business even when the kid who runs it is off at the playground. The lemonade stand ceases to be a viable business for the kid when he gets a little older and realizes he can make more money doing other things; or he’s one of the Nantucket Nectars guys that never gave it up and made millions…

The point is, businesses really fail when the logic that brought them into existence no longer holds — and that’s what the dotcom meltdown was really about. Too many of us all had ‘billionaire-in-a-year’ dreams, and when the bubble badly busted, far too few of us had the personal fortitude to look at our businesses and say, “Even if I take away the possibility of gazillions, if it takes struggle and difficulty and sidejobs and long, long years where the only reward is the chance to do the work itself — I will still carry on.”

I know a few small companies that made it through and even prospered after the bust because they were just grateful for the chance to serve, and even in a down market, people are powerfully attracted to that, and will pay. Turns out, selling people isn’t the painful, distasteful work a lot of techies think it is — when people feel you really want to serve them because it’s who you are, not because they’ll help make you rich, selling them isn’t nearly so hard.

But the rest of us gave the tech boom a bad name by doing it for the money we might get, not for the difference we might make for someone else. Really, that’s the selfishness, arrogance, immaturity that needed to be rooted out — and it was the exact thing at the heart of why customers weren’t foremost on my mind.

A great piece of advice I learned too late, only by experience: before you write a business plan, write a life plan, and get some real long-term success implementing that. And only start a business if it fits into your vision for your life whether it succeeds or it fails, because you just need to serve people in that particular way to continue on your journey. The logic behind the business has to be an organic extension of the logic of the lives of the people who start it, and that both have to based in real life, and have heart and integrity … It can sound kinda hokey, but it’s the key to the attitude of the guys we love and got into the business to be like — Steve Jobs, Sergey Brin, etal.

After a number of fits and starts the last 7 years, I’m finally trying again. Docspire.com will be launching soon — look out for it! And wish me luck…

Sean Nieuwoudt

Hi Stephan,

Sorry to hear the startup didn’t work, sounds like it was a really great product.

Thanks for a good read.

Regards,
Sean

Great advices, thank you Stephan. I personally started to think that failure stories are more enlightening than success stories.
By the way, I want to write a blog post about your story. But I can’t find your surname to give a reference. What is your surname?

stephan

@Mert: Right side: “About – Stephan Schmidt is currently a team manager at ImmobilienScout24 in Berlin.”

;-)

Stephan, a nice nice post. You have rightly said, Techies are so involved getting the tech to its best that they forget to focus on important aspects. I met with the same fate, and trying to learn from my mistakes. Hope you still have your Entrepreneurial dreams alive and will get into a new venture again.

Good Luck

Alb

Very wise words, it doesn’t matter if you’ve the best product in the world and another company has the worst – if they sell more than you, they are more successful. As well as sales personel, marketing can make or break you. Just look at the role Apples marketing has played in their recent success.

[...] “The best business plan is to sell people the things they want.” – Stephan Schmidt [...]

[...] Schmidt shares 6 reasons why his VC-funded startup failed. His case study is a good learning experience for all new startups that are popping [...]

[...] стартапах: 6 reasons why my VC funded startup did fail at Stephans Code Monkeyism. Собственно, причина там была одна — не было [...]

This is one of the best advice I’ve ever read about running a startup. I’ve been too careful to dedicate my resources on a single project till now, just because of the same reason, ‘We need to sell’.

[...] morning I found a link on the front page of delicious titled: 6 reasons why my VC funded startup did fail. Do you know what the main lessons from the failed start-up attempt [...]

Yes, selling your product is important. However, if you’re bleeding edge, you can focus on building a better mousetrap and still come out on top.

How? You sell your company.

Any number of cash-rich technology consulting companies would pay for your software, especially if it was a feature-rich solution they could bill for consulting services later.

Did you try this route?

stephan

@Head Pumpkin: No, but we’ve discussed this, and also talked about selling ourselves (another reason for big companies to buy startups is to buy talent), but when the dot com bubble did burst those technology consulting companies lost a lot of their customers and were not in the mood or position to buy startups. At least that was my impression.

[...] 6 reasons why my VC funded startup did fail at Stephans Code Monkeyism [...]

[...] 6 reasons why my VC funded startup did fail at Stephans Code Monkeyism (tags: web2.0 startups startup software lessons) [...]

With hindsight things are so clear. There was no market..you were not selling
Can we define some parameters which a startup can use to judge whether it is in trap?

[...] Schmidt shares 6 reasons why his VC-funded startup failed. His case study is a good learning experience for all new startups that are popping [...]

Thanks for your story. It’s very interesting to me that a large percentage of the people learning hard lessons at startups go on to try the open + consulting option as a one or two person company.

Perhaps we should be starting companies to support those people!

Anyway, here’s my startup postmortem.

Even with customers interested in paying for your product it can take months (years) for the purchase decision process to mature, especially with bigger companies. Get an early adopter as soon as you can, so that you can showcase your product in a real-life situation as soon as possible, this generates trust for your prospects.
http://www.transwide.com
Eventually the company became profitable and we sold it. There were 2 really tough years.

In our current company sales people outweigh IT people by a factor of 5.

Thanks for your code.

stephan

“In our current company sales people outweigh IT people by a factor of 5.”

Thanks for this insight, something along that line would be my ratio the next time too.

The company I work for uses Atlassian products including Jira and Wiki. They work well together.

What Atlassian does really well is sell you one part of their enterprise software as a product and then upsell you to the other products so you end up with their entire solution.

I agree with not waiting till you have a “complete” and “perfect” product till you sell it. The beauty of software is constant improvement.

Setting expectations early and often can mitigate a lot of customer complaints.

[...] in order to sell.  Sounds counter-intuitive but after reading about Stephan Schmidt’s experience on why his VC funded startup failed, it makes a lot of sense.  From my own experience of working at [...]

Inanc

Great insights, Stephen. I am currently working as a CTO in a two years old dotcom start-up. We have a very successful sales manager (and he has a bunch of sales people in his team) and very experienced dotcom business people.

Although, we are generating money, we are not profitable yet. We are paying our expenses evenly each month. And, we are still breathing.

We have switched to an agile delivery process which I think will make us more profitable by delivering more.

We are becoming a profitable company, after two years without seeing money :) All goes in goes out. But, because we are started with a prototype-like application which lacks most of the features, and because we are the first movers, and because we were doing sales at the day first; we are still breathing and will be.

[...] neotis wissensmanagement GmbH [...]

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Guide to CodeMonkeyism

Over the last 4 years I wrote many articles on this blog. To make it easier for you to find the relevant ones, I've organized them into topics.

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6 reasons why my VC funded startup did fail

Go Ahead: Next Generation Java Programming Style

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7 Bad Signs not to Work for a Software Company or Startup

Is Java dead?

Scala vs. Clojure

Never, never, never use String in Java

No future for functional programming in 2008 – Scala, F# and Nu

Clojure vs Scala, Part 2

Job Seeker

Another Good (Java) Interview Question

7 Bad Signs not to Work for a Software Company or Startup

Java Interview questions: Write a String Reverser (and use Recursion!)

Java Interview questions: Multiple Inheritance

As a Manager: What I value in developers

Top 10 Tips (+1) to Get a Pay Raise

Java Developer

Is Java Dead?

Go Ahead: Next Generation Java Programming Style

Be careful with magical code

All variables in Java must be final

Never, never, never use String in Java

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Startup/CTO

Development Dream Teams

6 reasons why my VC funded startup did fail

American vs. European style of Software Development

12 Things to Reduce Your Lead Time and Time to Market

The high cost of overhead when working in parallel

Essential storage tradeoff: Simple Reads vs. Simple Writes

Agilist

What Developers Need to Know About Agile

5 Practices Better to Change in Your Scrum Implementation

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ScrumMaster and ZenMaster: The joke of certification

What is Trans-Scrum?